Following up on our "What is Metaphysics" session, here are my two cents. A tiny little piece of Wittgenstein on Heidegger. Yes, apparently Wittgenstein read Heidegger, and had something to say about him. Now, this is just an informal conversation with friends -- Wittgenstein never wrote intensively on Heidegger, nor for that matter on anyone else. So it's always hard to know what to make of such episodic, aphoristic notes. Still, I think it's interesting. (click it to expand, please)
(By the way, sorry for the crappy screen capture. This is from a totally different book. But there's a reference there to the source).
How do I understand this? Basically, Wittgenstein seems to by saying that yes, we can all identify with the kind of experience Heidegger describes: the dread, the sense of nothingness, astonishment (the "Why") etc. The question is what do you go on to do with it. From Wittgenstein perspective (and here we should note this was written during the so called "early Wittgenstein" period -- although I would venture to say this particular view applies for the later one as well), what Heidegger is doing is to try and investigate that realm of "beyond". And as much as he insists that this is not conceptual knowledge, it's still an attempt to construct knowledge. For Wittgenstein, this won't fly. There's no knowledge, conceptual or other, to be spoken of there. Heidegger ends up producing a lot of, basically, non-sense, albeit wrapped up in an air of profoundness. For Wittgenstein, the most you can do is point to the border between sense and non-sense, being and nothing; to point to that sense of dread etc. -- and that is indeed an important thing to do (he's not dismissing that). But don't delude yourself that you can actually provide answers about what goes on there, and certainly not that this kind of investigation (read metaphysics) should serve as some kind of basis for other forms of knowledge (science).
We read On the Shores of Politics this week, intro, chap 4 and either chap 1 or 2 + diacritics interview.
Some themes:
1. Rancieré does not have a theory of reception, persuasion or the after effects of the political moment. In other words, politics proper is the enunciation (appearance, imparity, grievance) of an excluded group but what happens afterwards is not his concern. In a most extreme logical example, could one say that a political demand that fails -- that is, the government listens to the demands of a group but nonetheless does not accede to the demands -- is STILL politics proper? For Rancieré, it has to be.
2. Does Rancieré have a deficient theory of the commodity form? This was something I brought up and I'm not sure if I explained myself clearly during the discussion. This was what I was thinking: my initial reaction to the idea that "we are all German Jews," "we are proletariats," "the government is a tyranny," etc. are political acts is that while these enunciative moments certainly have an explosive potential they are ALSO easily accommodated and defused of politics. See: Ché t-shirts. To me, this is an example of the commodification of dissent (see Thomas Frank).
Further, Rancieré constantly speaks of the surplus/lack of the demos, the gap between word and reality. But he has no theory for where this inequality originates. In other words, this is where a theory of capital accumulation could come in handy.
Now, I know Jacques has already answered these questions in advance by the way he frames his argument. But consider this: the way that Jacques characterizes so-called Marxism always seems to be a Marxism of sociology and of class struggle. In other words, Communism. If one were to respond with a theorization of capital that emphasizes the commodity form and accumulation of capital as the prime movers of history RATHER than class, do not most of Jacques' arrows seem rather off the mark? And does not the recognition of the radical flexibility of the commodity form seem to make dissent rather easily commodified?
Does that make sense?
3. Finally, while at a bookstore after our talk, I opened up the new Zizek book and looked up Ranciere in the index. Here is the one substantive mention of him (also available here). I think it's an unfair characterization (of both him and Badiou) but food for thought:
It is against this background that one can formulate a critique of Jacques Rancière's political aesthetics, of his idea of the aesthetic dimension of the proper political act: a democratic explosion reconfigures the established hierarchic "police" order of social space, it stages a spectacle of a different order, of a different partage of the public space. [25] In today's "society of spectacle," such an aesthetic reconfiguration lost its subversive dimension: it can all too easily be appropriated by the existing order. The true task are not momentary democratic explosions which undermine the established "police" order, but the dimension designated by Badiou as that of the "fidelity" to the Event: how to translate/inscribe the democratic explosion into the positive "police" order, how to impose on social reality a NEW lasting order. THIS is the properly "terrorist" dimension of every authentic democratic explosion: the brutal imposition of a new order. And this is why, while everybody loves democratic rebellions, the spectacular/carnivalesque explosions of the popular will, anxiety arises when this will wants to persist, to institutionalize itself - and the more "authentic" the rebellion is, the more "terrorist" is this institutionalization.
So it looks to me like Althusser accuses Sartre of bad faith...
Caught in this double declaration of faith on the one hand in an idea of Marxism, on the other in the cause of all the exploited, Sartre reassures himself of the fact that he really does have a role to play, beyond the 'Words' he produces and regards with derision, in the inhuman history of our times, with a theory of 'dialectical reason' which assigns to all (theoretical) rationality, and to every (revolutionary) dialectic, the unique transcendental origin of the human 'project'. Thus in Sartre historicist humanism takes the form of an exaltation of human freedom, in which by freely committing himself to their fight, he can commune with the freedom of all the oppressed, who have always been struggling for a little human light since the long and forgotten night of the slave revolts. (RC, p. 142)
(ouch this hits close to home... I'd like to recognize Sartre's bad faith and yet refrain from letting it go)
An implicit part of Althusser's critique is the accusation that Sartre doesn't own to up what he's actually doing - writing philosophy. Regardless whether the notion of praxis collapses the distinction between theoretical and political practice, Sartre is still writing philosophy, not fighting on the barricades. Of course, neither is Althusser, but he owns up to the fact in a different way.
3 simple questions that might help understanding their incompatibility:
1. What are they doing?
2. What do they think they are doing?
3. How does what they think they are doing affect what they are doing?
I think one reason these thinkers talk past each other (or alternatively, one reason they could both occupy different places in a philosophical division of labor) is that questions #2 and #3 are much more relevant for Sartre than for Althusser. This is a gross oversimplification, but Althusser only needs to describe the complexly veiled object (Capital) whereas Sartre takes this object for granted because Marx has already analyzed it.
So do we reread Marx and (re)do an analysis of Capital, or do we assume that Marx's task in that book has been completed - there is nothing left to do - and set about trying to understand why Capital is not mandatory reading in public schools?
I want to spin Naveh's question around with another Zizek tidbit (Zizek is sorta like S/A smooshed together in a way): Zizek constantly rhetorically asks the question: "Do you think the problem is that voters need more information so they'll be convinced of the evil of capitalism, imperialism, etc? No, the problem is precisely the opposite, they have too much information."
As much as I'm attracted to Althusser, I'm suspicious of this attraction for the following reason: I want to believe that there exists a vast unexplored epistemological terrain full of complicated hidden structures and apparatuseses (I do hate that word). It's the lure of esotericism - of exploring new, mind-bogglingly complicated worlds that are completely invisible. The question is whether production in this specific domain is actually worthwhile. It's also too easy to slip into an easy affirmation of the academic division of labor by saying something to the effect of, "I sure am glad somebody's writing about this object-domain so I don't have to."
On the one hand, I feel like I could argue that Althusser is co-opted by information society, technocrats, etc. (don't act yet - keep analyzing!). On the other, one could argue that Sartre is co-opted by neo-liberalism, hippies, etc. Do we attack freedom by pushing it to the limit so that it self-destructs (Baudrillard: pataphysics - Sartre's version of freedom sometimes sounds completely suicidal) or do we attack freedom by showing that it's an effect of interpellation? Both?
Also, went to a talk at Todai today that pointed out that Althusser is also linked into the Husserl-machine via Jean Cavailles, Jean-Toussaint Desanti, Bachelard and a bunch of anthropology of technology people like Bertrand Gille. They all did phenomenology of math, science, and technology stuff (linked to post-Kantian set theory). He gave the following simple explanation: two rivers flow out of Husserl - one leads to the subject via Heidegger (French dudes like Levinas and Sartre underestimated the conflict between Husserl and Heidegger). The other river emphasizes the "back to the things themselves!" part of Husserl. These people love objects (Cavailles, Desanti, Gilbert Simondon, etc.).
Well, by now it's probably clear to y'all that I'm not too fond of Sartre, and I guess I've been quite vocal about it too.
Regardless of what I think, though, there seems to be the historical or sociological question (in the sense of sociology of French academy) of why does it seem -- rightly or wrongly -- that Sartre has fallen out of favor, or out of fashion. I can't think of any other major European or American thinker who is citing him as a significant influence. Again, it's a question mark for me. Who was Sartre's circle? Who read him Whom did he influence? What about that journal he founded, Les Temps Moderne (which is still running, BTW). Has any of you ever read anything from that journal, or saw citations from it? I can't think of one. So again, are we talking about a very small, perhaps even marginal group? Did he have his moment and then faded? Did he appeal to youngsters of a certain generation and then failed to recognize major developments? And how does that fit in with the thousands and thousands who attended his funeral and all that? I honestly don't know.
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But turning now from this sociological question to a more content-based one, let me try and summarize very briefly why I think Sartre is committing some fundamental mistakes. And if I'm not mistaken, then those are also the mistakes that many other French thinkers would hold him accountable for. Even if--and that goes back to the previous puzzle--they didn't really write any explicit criticisms of him. (Does anyone know of a text by, say, Foucault, criticizing Sartre's idea of freedom, directly I mean? I don't. Is this debate there in the background and we're just not noticing it because we're not sensitive to the politics of the Left Bank, and to the subtleties of French academic writing? Maybe).
OK. So the two major reproaches to Sartre seem to revolve around (1) his idea of freedom and (2) his idea of consciousness or reflection.
(1) Sartre's idea of freedom seems to be too individualistic, and that in two respects. First, in the sense that it seems to be about individual people attaining freedom, and not so much about groups or classes. Second, it's individualistic in the sense that it's all about me breaking away from the role assigned to me by others, me escaping myself. Perhaps we can say it's an 'escapist' kind of freedom. Recall here Ramona's example of Sartre's play Kean, which ends with the hero going "fuck all this, I'm going to America". Great. Have you made any significant social change? No. You're escaping because you don't like being told what to do. Very mature. (sorry, I'm riffing here).
Perhaps this point is best made by asking what is the problem of freedom for Sartre. What's bothering him? What is he trying to solve? It seems to me--from my limited understanding--that it's something like Roussaue's dilemma: men are born free but everywhere they are in chains. Freedom, says Sartre in Being and Nothingness, is the essence of man. Admittedly, it's a negative, rather than positive essence: freedom seems to be a very rare and fleeting condition for Sartre, as opposed to something lasting and ever-present. We're free in the sense that we can not be who we are. At any given moment we can step out of ourselves, choose to do things otherwise, etc. So while freedom is our essence, that is to say that we are, in principle, always free, it's as if this freedom is for the most part "buried", latent, potential. It only surfaces and manifests itself in those moments we negate ourselves (step outside our roles, outside ourselves, catch ourselves as being in bad faith, etc).
So what's the problem? The problem is that most of us don't realize just how essentially, how deeply, how fundamentally free we in fact are. We tend to think of freedom as something positive, something we can hold, something we have, whereas in fact it's what we're not; or better yet, it's our potentiality to not be what we are (or what we think we are, or what others think we are--he gives many variations to this). In other words--and I think this is the crucial issue--the problem of freedom for Sartre is that people don't quite live up to their freedom potential. And I would even go so far as to make the following conjecture: for Sartre, the problem (say with Marxism) is that there's too much talk about how unfree people are (or at least certain groups of poeple). Whereas in fact, we are much more free than we think. Resistance--and subsequently freedom--"starts from within", so to speak.
Now let me contrast this with someone like Althusser, Foucault, or even Zizek. They would say the problem is precisely the opposite. The problem is that today (at least since the great democratic revolutions, and increasingly so in post-WW2 liberal societies) there's so much talk (or ideology) about how free we all are. And what we don't realize is just how unfree we really are. Ideology and power trickle down to very intimate areas of our lives, shaping not just where we can work and how much we earn but also what and how we desire (Disneyland). And I think that this is something Sartre would either never get, or would never be willing to accept.To him this would sound like abomination, a sin against the deep-seated fundamental freedom of man. This, I think, is the major fault line. Can we rescue Sartre even after Foucault and Zizek and many others have shown us just how implicated we are in networks of power and desire that are beyond our control? Can Sartre nonetheless say "yes, this might be true, but under all those layers there's still a kernel of negative-freedom"? Or even, "yes, I'll grant you we are shaped and molded in more intimate and small-scale ways than I first admitted--and yet I still maintain that we succumb to those forces out of our willful choice, and at any given moment we are free to will otherwise"? That seems to me to be the 64,000 dollar question. (2) The problem with Sartre's idea of consciousness or reflection I think I actually already touched on this point, so I'll try to be brief. Sartre thinks that, at least in principle, we can always be reflective about who we are, who we expect ourselves to be, what others expect us to be, how we lie to ourselves (bad faith), etc. People like Lacan and Althusser, for example, think this is too naive.
In short, Lacan would say that the very categories by which you reflect upon yourself, the very words you use to do it, to express yourself to yourself, even if it's a non-verbal language (not words as such)--those are never under your complete control. Your control is always relative, always to a degree, always within the confines of a "system" which is not of your making. That doesn't mean you don't have a certain leeway, a certain degree of freedom. It just means it's never complete freedom, because that would mean complete transparency--of language, society, etc. And for the structuralists, this can never be attained. Not because we are limited, or because we tend to lie to ourselves too much (bad faith etc.), but because we are always-already part of the system, and hence can't be completely reflective from the inside (in other words, the problem is not psychological, but structural).
Think of Althusser's exapmle of how your parents choose a name for you even before you are born, as a kind of "primary" interpellation. Think also of Butler's example of the doctors in the delivery room going "it's a girl". Again, it's not that we are completely determined by those things. It's just that Sartre's position seems to be too naive: as if with enough honesty I could reflect upon my life and realize what are my problems and what I really want to do about them.
Another way to put it is this: Sartre's idea of freedom is based on a false idea of autonomy. Namely, of control, of taking charge of your life. And one of the big lessons of psychoanalysis (which he rejects), or of Foucault's theory of power (which would make him sick, I think), is that we are never autonomous. Certainly not in the way Sartre would like us to be.
* * *
Epilogue: Sartre and Ranciere All that being said, let me end with a quote from Sartre, and I'll leave open the question just how similar or not this is to Ranciere's project in Night of Labor. Is Sartre back with a vengeance after everything I said? I wonder.
"A person wishing to study one of those culture groups which we find in certain factories, will not be quit of them by resorting to the old remark--the workers believe that they are reading... but in actuality they are only retarding their own attainment of self-awareness and delaying the emancipation of the Proletariat. For it is very true that they are delaying the moment of their own awareness, but it is very true also that they read and that their reading is effected at the center of a community which favors it and which is developed by means of it." (Sartre, The Search for Method, part 1 -- sorry, don't have page numbers: it's the fifth paragraph from the end of part one)
Althusser. Reading Capital. The chapters “Marxism is not Historicism”
and “Marx’s Immense Theoretical Revolution”
——— For Marx. The chapters “Introduction”
and the Appendix to “Contradiction and Overdetermination”
Here are some notes and thoughts I have following this meeting. It’s not meant as any kind of official summary or protocol – I didn’t take any notes during the session, and I’m sure I’m leaving out some points that we’ve discussed. So please regard this as very informal notes from my limited perspective.
First, I have to say I think we had a very good meeting, and I’m really looking forward to the next one. Speaking for myself, it helped me clarify several points about Althusser, and to focus on several key questions – even if we weren’t able to come up with answers. Second, some general comments on Althusser. Agree with him or not, the guy’s extremely sharp and analytic, and my hat’s off to him for that. He alone is enough to dispel the bad rap about “French obscurantism”. He goes to such pain to define every single concept it’s really admirable. Not saying it’s all perfectly clear to me, but you’ve got to admire the effort. See his comments on the (excellent) glossary by the translator Ben Brewster, for example. Another admirable trait: his rare intellectual honesty. How many authors do you know who are willing to say “I got this and that point wrong in my previous work and I hope I’ve been able to correct it here”? Kudos to Louis.
Let me start with some responses to the questions Andy sent via email and which we didn’t have time to address. I’ll try to be brief. First, Andy’s third question, which I’m rephrasing here: how is Althusser ultimately different from Sartre’s position, which basically says “Marxism, yes, but more complex”? Is there really a substantial difference between them? —Don’t have a definite answer to this one, but I’d like to suggest the following: it does seem to me that Sartre insists on what we might call a “description from a first-person perspective” (and here we might think about his phenomenological background), whereas Althusser, in a more traditional Marxist vein, wants a “third-person” or “system” perspective. But then again, perahaps I’m taking this too far. For instance, what would I say about Althusser’s policeman example in the Ideology article – isn’t that a first-person description as well (what happens to someone when they hear “hey you!”)?
Another related point to this question, which we didn’t really develop, is Althusser’s discussion of Sartre in the last part of the Appendix to “Contradiction and Overdetermination”. That’s where he says that Sartre is basically comitting the same mistake as Engels. Here’s my understanding of this. The Engels/Sartre approach, says Althusser, aims to explain how the sum total (the agregate) of individual activities results not in chaos but in some coherent and relatively structured social reality. Put differently, how do we start from particular wills, which are apparently free, and end up with a social system in which my personal will isn’t really expressed, and where I’m not really free. The problem with this question, says Althusser, is that it assumes that the “basic position” is one of free individuals. In other words, in Sartre’s model, it is as if we are born free and then cast into a world of social patterns that shape us, with greater or lesser degree of success (usually greater). But in fact, says Althusser, we are always-already shaped by those structures and ideologies. And the prime example (which I’m pretty sure he borrows from Lacan) is that even before we are born our parents – and this itself is already not their decision but a social structure – give us a name etc.
Now to the question what does Althusser mean by “determination of the economy in the last instance”. Again, it’s not entirely clear to me, nor am I sure that Althusser himself gives a definite answer. Here’s my best shot. If you try to take every single social phenomena and trace it to the economic sphere, namely to means of producsion and to relations of production – that won’t work. Certainly not with cultural phenomena. What that means is that society is composed of multiple spheres or sub-systems (not Althusser’s term), such as law, politics, art, the academy, etc. Now, each such sphere does have a relative “degree of freedom”, which gives it some “independence” from the economic infrastructure. Again, it’s not all one-to-one determination by the economy. And yet, the general structure of those sub-systems – say modern law, modern art, etc. – is determined by the economic sphere – say capitalism. In other words, if that makes sense at all: the economic sphere gives you the general “borders” or “parameters” of the other spheres, on the one hand; and yet, on the other hand, within thouse boundaries each sphere enjoys a relative degree of freedom. So the economic determination is “global” and not so much in the finer details. — What’s the ultimate test of that? Well, I’m not sure what Althusser might say, but perhaps something like this (and here I’m influenced by Zizek): You can go ahead and write a book that’s very critical of capitalism. Why? Because there’s a high degree of freedom in the cultural sphere, at least in first-world liberal societies. But try and really threaten capitalism’s economic dominance, and then you’ll be stopped.
OK. This is getting kind of long. Let me try and be brief with the following points that came up in the meeting
- His take on science: very interestingly, he says science is not part of the superstructure, namely it’s not determined by the economic base-structure.Science has a history of its own. Science is either true or not true, and can be appreciated as such. —[BTW, he refers here to Stalin’s (!) article on language. Anyone interested in picking up that ball? I know Zizek has a text about it as well. ]
- His references to Lenin: those seem to betray something important about his stand, which might also be an important difference from Sartre. Like Lenin, he wants an intellectual avant-garde that would bring the message to the masses. Realizing the true form of oppression and the right way to resist it (but is there one?) is not going to just “emerge” from people’s living experience. And thus, if someone (Sartre?) thinks their job is to just lend a voice to the miseries and cries of the wretched of the earth, they are wrong – the job is to lend them a theory.
- “The authorless theater” – a fascinating metaphor, I think, and one that seems to be aimed right at Sartre. Ramona very pointedly commented that the aim is not just intellectual but also very ad-hominem, as if to say: “those pretend-intellectuals who think they can elaborate theory with theatrical works”. This is one point I’d love to develop next time. — This term comes up in “Marx’s immense Theoretical Revolution”, the end of the second-from-last paragraph. Now, I’m pretty sure I saw it in one of the other text’s we’ve read, but I haven’t been able to locate it.
- Finally, a small one for Andy: you asked me where does he mention the term “symptomatic reading”. Check out the index to RC under “reading, symptomatic”. One place we had in our reading is the last paragraph of “Marxism is not Historicism”, where I think he explains it rather well (and also explicitly compares it to Lacan’s reading of Freud).
